Dr Francesco Furini

Postdoctoral Researcher

I am a Postdoctoral Researcher in the CERES project, Work Package 4, at PIK. My research uses game theory to study international cooperation on climate change and global public goods provision. In particular, I investigate how different policy instruments and institutional arrangements can alter countries' incentives and strategic behaviour, with the aim of identifying mechanisms that can foster and sustain international cooperation and effective public good provision.

Contact

Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK)
francesco.furini@pik-potsdam.de[at]pik-potsdam.de
P.O. Box 60 12 03
14412 Potsdam

ORCID

I obtained my PhD in Science and Management of Climate Change from Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. During my doctoral studies, I spent six months as a visiting researcher at the University of Graz. Before joining PIK, I worked as a research associate (postdoc) at the Chair of Ecological Economics at the University of Hamburg.

My research focuses on strategic issues in environmental and climate economics. In particular, I am interested in the game-theoretic modelling of international environmental agreements and the voluntary provision of public goods. More broadly, my research examines how incentives and strategic interactions shape individual behaviour, collective action, and public good provision.

  • Furini F., Finus M. (2026), Challenges and Opportunities of Solar Geoengineering for Climate Governance. International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, forthcoming.
  • Finus, M. and Furini F. (2026), Global Public Good Agreements with Fixed Costs. Oxford Economics Papers, Gpag005.
  • Finus, M., F. Furini (2025), On the credibility of threats to avoid the deployment of solar geoengineering. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, vol.27.
  • Finus M., Furini F., Rohrer A. V. (2024), Barrett’s Paradox of Cooperation: A Full Analytical Proof 30 Years After. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 103045.
  • Finus, M., F. Furini and A.V. Rohrer (2024), The Stackelberg vs. Nash-Cournot Folk-Theorem in International Environmental Agreements. Economics Letters, Vol. 234.
  • Finus M., Furini F. (2023), Global Climate Governance in the Light of Geoengineering: A Shot in the Dark? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 122.
  • Finus M., Furini F., Rohrer A. V. (2021), The Efficacy of International Environmental Agreements when Adaptation Matters: Nash-Cournot vs Stackelberg Leadership. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 109.
  • Furini F., Bosello F. (2021), Accounting for Adaptation and its Effectiveness in International Environmental Agreements. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Vol. 23.