Y. M. Svirezhev, W. von Bloh and H.-J. Schellnhuber
Environmental Modeling & Assessment 4(4), 235-242 (1999)
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK),
Telegrafenberg, P.O. Box 60 12 03, 14412 Potsdam, Germany.
If there are no doubts that we must reduce
the total emission of carbon dioxide then the problem of
how much different countries should be allowed to
contribute to this amount remains a serious one.
We suggest this problem to be considered as a non-antagonistic
game (in Germeier's sense). A game of
this kind is called an "emission" game. Suppose
that there are n independent actors (countries or
regions), each of them releasing a
certain amount of CO2 per year (in carbon units)into the atmosphere, and that
the emission would be reduced by each actor. Each actor
has his own aim: to minimise the loss in the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) caused by the reduction of
emissions. On the other hand taking into account that
it is impossible to estimate more or less precisely
the impact of the climate change on GDP for each country today,
a common strategy will be to reduce the climate change.
Since one of the main leading factors in global warming is the
greenhouse effect, then the common aim will be to reduce
the sum of emissions. This is a typical conflict
situation. How to resolve it? We can weigh the "egoistic"
and "altruistic" criteria for each actor introducing
so-called "coefficients of egoism". This
coefficient is very large, if the actor uses a very
egoistic strategy, and conversely, if the actor is a
"super-altruist", then the corresponding coefficient
is very small. Using these coefficients we get the
general solution of the game in a form of some
Pareto's equilibrium. The solution is stable and efficient.
Keywords: global change, CO2 emission, game theory, Pareto's equilibrium
Full text of article as a HTML-document.