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MICA - Modeling International Climate Agreements

MICA - Modeling International Climate Agreements

The Model of International Climate Agreements (MICA) is a multi-actor optimal growth model describing the basic economic dynamics of selected world regions as well as the dynamics of global warming due to anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases.

MICA can be solved for non-cooperative behavior of the regions (Nash Equilibrium), full cooperation (global social optimum), and any coalition of regions cooperating in climate policy (Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium).

Model documentation

Overview of the main model characteristics:

Further information on the model:

 

For questions about MICA, please contact Kai Lessmann.


Model versions

Version Changes/addtional features
2.0 Calibration to 11 world regions; used in Lessmann et al. (2015)
1.2 Emission permit trading; used in Lessmann et al. (2013)
1.1 Endogenous technological change; used in Lessmann and Edenhofer (2010)
1.0 Basic model version + international trade with national product differentiation; used in Lessmann et al. (2009)

Publications

  • The stability and effectiveness of climate coalitions: A comparative analysis of multiple integrated assessment models, at Our Common Future under Climate Change 2015, [PDF, 356KB].
  • Lessmann, K., U. Kornek, V. Bosetti, R. Dellink, J. Emmerling, J. Eyckmans, M. Nagashima, H.-P. Weikard, Z. Yang (2015): "The stability and effectiveness of climate coalitions: A comparative analysis of multiple integrated assessment models". Environmental and Resource Economics, Volume 62, Issue 4, pp 811-836, doi:10.1007/s10640-015-9886-0, updated manscript.
  • Lessmann, K., R. Marschinski, M. Finus, U. Kornek, O. Edenhofer (2013): "Emissions trading with non-signatories in a climate agreement - An analysis of coalition stability", The Manchester School, doi:10.1111/manc.12045. Bath Economics Research Paper version (pre-peer-review).
  • Lessmann, K. and O. Edenhofer: "Research Cooperation and International Standards in a Model of Coalition Stability." Resource and Energy Economics, in press. doi:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2010.01.001, PDF.
  • Lessmann, K., R. Marschinski, O. Edenhofer (2009). "The effects of tariffs on coalition formation in a dynamic global warming game" Economic Modelling 26(3):641-649. doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2009.01.005, PDF

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