

STABILITY AND RESILIENCE OF POWER GRIDS

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Power Grid Stability & Resilience in face of Climate Change

Stability and Resilience of Complex Systems

Network Basin Stability applied to Power Grids

Complex Networks Analysis of Power Grids

Smart Wiring



1. Power Grid Stability & Resilience in face of Climate Change






Power Grid Stability and Mitigation of Climate Change

- Mitigation (GHG emissions reduction) requires **renewable energy**
- Renewable energy generation **fluctuates** strongly
 - wind strength/direction, sunshine, cloudiness may vary fast
- Large fluctuations must not **destabilize** the power grid!
- Make grid stable under largely fluctuating generation!



FLUCTUATING RENEWABLE GENERATION

Aggregate solar and wind production in Germany:



(data provided by grid operators 50Hertz, Amprion, Tennet, and TransnetBW)

(Additional regional fluctuations not shown here)




Power Grid Resilience and Adaptation of Climate Change

- Climate change will increase frequency and severity of extreme weather events
- Iarge (local) perturbation in a power grid
- → local transmission line trips → redistribution of power flow
- → If grid is not resilient (cannot cope with the redistribution), further lines trip → cascading failure → interregional blackout!
- Make grid resilient to perturbations of all magnitudes!



Extreme Weather Events




STAKEHOLDER ISSUES

Integrated systemic assessment

- interactions with other energy systems/infrastructure
- "system services"

Increasing fluctuations/dynamics

- temporary supply/demand mismatches
- novel control mechanism
- storage




Scarce computational resources


- operations: simulation timing
- planning: no. of considered variants

Integrating more renewables

- changing operational rules
- virtual power plants
- better optimisation of operations
- sharp increase in share



2. Stability and Resilience of Complex Systems






A Success Story: Stability under *small* perturbations

Alexandr M. Lyapunov (1857–1918)

Small perturbations are easier to study than large ones!

- if a perturbation is small, the complex system's reaction is equivalent to the reaction of a much simpler, "linearized" system
- mathematically, only linear algebra (eigen value theory) is needed
- states/modes of a system can be classified into "stable", "semistable", "unstable", etc.



ed. Many no fr.

PROBLEMS WITH THIS LINEARIZATION APPROACH

- The classification into stable, semistable, unstable is mainly qualitative
- *Quantification* of stability/resilience is more *difficult*
- Power grids are complex non-linear systems




- For non-linear systems, the linearization approach tells almost *nothing* about the impact of *large* fluctuations or perturbations!
- Other concepts are needed!



BASINS OF ATTRACTION &THE IMPACT OF *large* PERTURBATIONS


Metaphor: a marble dispersed in honey


Highly viscous fluid (honey)



BASIN STABILITY = SIZE OF BASIN OF ATTRACTION QUANTIFIES STABILITY

Example: simplistic model of a bistable forest/savanna





RESILIENCE VS. STABILITY

Working definition here:


- Stability = perturbations will not push the system out of its normal state for long
- Resilience = the system can find a new stable states by reorganizing itself (automatically)




3. Network Basin Stability applied to Power Grids










SIMULATE RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATING MODE AFTER A LARGE PERTURBATION AT A SINGLE NODE



SIMULATE RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATING MODE AFTER A LARGE PERTURBATION AT A SINGLE NODE

Dynamics of grid node *i* (simplest approx., "swing equation"/

phase: $\frac{d}{dt}\theta_i = \omega_i$ 2nd order Kuramoto): frequency: $\frac{d}{dt}\omega_i = P_i - D\omega_i - K \cdot \sum_j A_{ij} \sin(\theta_i - \theta_j)$

 $(\theta,\omega)_{t_1}$

operating mode

0

 $\theta - \theta_{s}$

3 0

-15

 $-\pi$

 $\omega_{\rm ns}(t) \approx \frac{P}{\alpha} + \frac{\alpha K}{P} \cos\left(\frac{P}{\alpha}t\right)$

 $\theta(\theta_s, 0) = (\theta, \omega)_{t_0}$

 π


Parameters:

- P_i net power input at node
- α dissipation constant
- *K* coupling constant
- *A_{ij}* adjacency matrix(1 if linked, 0 otherwise)




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SIMULATE RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATING MODE AFTER A LARGE PERTURBATION AT A SINGLE NODE




Smart Wiring = Add a few Lines at optimal positions




4. Complex Networks Analysis of Power Grids



COMPLEX NETWORK THEORY









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Statistical Analysis of Network Topologies





Characteristics of Power Grid Topologies

- 50 10,000 nodes
- Exponential degree distribution $p_k \sim e^{-k/\gamma}$ with $1.5 < \gamma < 2 \rightarrow not Erdös-Renyi random or scale-free$

P(K=k)


- Very sparse: average node degree approx.
 - 2.8 for transmission grids (tree + 40% additional lines)
 - 2 (tree) for distribution grids (almost no redundant lines)
- Large average path length O(√N) due to spatial embedding → not small-world
- Low clustering coefficient → not "random geometric"

> how to generate synthetic grids for simulations?



Model for Generating Synthetic Power Grid Topologies

- Initial layout
 - given initial node locations,
 - construct the "minimal spanning tree
 - then add some redundant lines
- Growth phase
 - either connect a new node to the closest existing node
 - and to some other node for redundancy
 - or put a new node somewhere along an existing line
- Trade off between global and local redundancy
 - by maximizing (1 + internal grid distance)^r / (spatial distance)^{\tilde{p}}
 - where *r* is a redundancy control parameter





nfrastructure Network

rowth Model fo

Minimal Spanning Tree (MST)


- optimizes one-time construction costs
- no redundant lines
- → one tripping line already causes a partial blackout






Grown Tree, Link to Nearest Neighbour

- optimizes node-wise extension costs
- initial long lines appear sub-optimal later
- still no redundant lines






MST + Global Redundant Lines

(large *r* parameter)

- meshlike structure, many "large" circles
- \rightarrow very few dead ends
- → improved basin stability



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but:

- few triangles
- → cascading failures may occur

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
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
MST + Local Redundant Lines

(small *r* parameter)


- many triangles
- → flow through tripping line is redistributed to few other lines
- → long failure cascades less likely

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




RESILIENCE AGAINST CASCADING FAILURES vs. Basin Stability




Relationship between Basin Stability and Standard Network Statistics



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Even Clearer Relationship to Specially Adapted Network Statistics



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New Journal of Physics

Detours around

basin stability in power networks.

Schultz P, Heitzig J, Kurths J (2014)





Lesson: Know which type of redundancy affects which aspect of stability/Resilience!

- In general, additional ("redundant") lines improve stability
 - Traditional "N-1" criterion: grid must stay connected when one appliance/line fails
 - But: adding a line may also *destabilise* another grid region (Braess' paradox)
- Different **types of redundancy**:
 - **local** redundancy (high clustering, short detours) helps avoiding long **failure cascades** leading to large blackouts
 - **global** redundancy (high connectivity, low path length, long-range connections) more important for **dynamic stability**
 - in view of economic constraints: good trade-off needed



Lesson: Some "motifs" should be avoided or produced

- **Hub nodes**: use as "stability anchors"!
 - connect new lines preferably to them than to their immediate neighbours
- **Dead ends/dead trees**: *avoid!*
 - connect pairs of leaf nodes (improves local redundancy)
 - connect leaf node to a hub in another part of grid (global redundancy)
- "Detour" nodes: produce!
 - e.g. connect neighbours of hubs with each other (local redundancy)




6. Outlook



Transient Behaviour: From Basin Stability to *Survivability*


survivability = P (system stays in desired region | random perturbation)





DECENTRAL SMART GRID CONTROL

Idea: make *price* (and thus demand) a linear function of past *frequency*



B. Schäfer, C. Grabow, S. Auer, D. Witthaut, M. Timme. Taming Instabilities in Power Grid Networks by Decentralized Control (2015). Submitted to EPJ.



More Realistic Model of Node Dynamics: Phase & Freq. → Phase, Freq. & *Voltage*

$$V = E_d + iE_q$$

$$\frac{d\phi_i}{d\tau} = \omega_i,$$

$$\frac{d^2\phi}{d\tau^2} = P_i - (E_{q,i}I_{q,i} - E_{d,i}I_{d,i}) - \alpha_i\omega_i$$


$$T_{d,i}\frac{dE_{q,i}}{d\tau} = -E_{q,i} + X_{d,i}I_{d,i} + E_f,$$

$$T_{q,i}\frac{dE_{d,i}}{d\tau} = -E_{d,i} + X_{q,i}I_{q,i},$$

$$I_i = \sum_{j=1}^N K_{ij}V_j e^{i(\phi_j - \phi_i)}$$

S. Auer, K. Kleis, P. Schultz, J. Kurths, F. Hellmann: Model Detail for large perturbation studies of power grids. *In preparation*.

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PUBLICATIONS

Menck PJ, <u>Heitzig</u> J, Marwan N, Kurths J (2013) How basin stability complements the linear-stability paradigm. *Nature Physics* 9:89–92. doi:10.1038/nphys2516

Ji P, Peron TKD, Menck PJ, Rodrigues F, Kurths J (2013) Cluster explosive synchronization in complex networks. *Physical Review Letters* 110(21):1–5. doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.110.218701

Menck PJ, <u>Heitzig</u> J, Kurths J, Schellnhuber HJ (2014) How dead ends undermine power grid stability. *Nature Communications* 5:3969. doi:10.1038/ncomms4969

Schultz P, Heitzig J, Kurths J (2014)

A Random Growth Model for Power Grids and Other Spatially Embedded Infrastructure Networks. *EPJ ST Resilient Power Grids and Extreme Events* 223(12):2593–2610. doi:10.1140/epjst/e2014-02279-6

Schultz P, <u>Heitzig</u> J, Kurths J (2014) Detours around basin stability in power networks. *New Journal of Physics* 16:125001. doi:10.1088/1367-2630/16/12/125001

<u>Heitzig</u> J, Fujiwara N, Aihara K, Kurths J (2014) Editorial: Interdisciplinary challenges in the study of power grid resilience and stability and their relation to extreme weather events. In: <u>Heitzig</u> J, Fujiwara N, Aihara K, Kurths J (eds.) Resilient Power Grids and Extreme Events, *EPJ Special Topics* 223(12):2383–2386

Plietzsch A, Schultz P, <u>Heitzig</u> J, Kurths J (2015) Local vs global redundancy – tradeoffs between resilience against cascading failures and frequency stability. Submitted to *EPJ ST*

Hellmann F, Schultz P, Grabow C, <u>Heitzig</u> J, Kurths J (2015) Survivability: a unifiying concept for the transient resilience of deterministic dynamical systems. *In revision*

Kleis K, Auer S, Hellmann F, Schultz P, Kurths J (2015).

The impact of model detail on power grid resilience measures. In preparation for EPJ ST



TAKE HOME MESSAGES

The (node-wise) basin stability concept can help to find weak points in power grids by simulation. Adjusted topological statistics can speed this up by preselecting potentially critical nodes. Suitable random generators for power grid topologies enable ensemble simulations in power grid research.

Thank you for your attention – I'm curious for your comments!

Contact: heitzig | hellmann | schultz @pik-potsdam.de

