

# What can we learn from the IPCC?

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## Research and Solutions

Prof. Dr. Ottmar Edenhofer

CRC 1026 – Macroeconomic Sustainability Assessment (A4)

MGK Round Lecture

October 16, 2014



CRC 1026 Sustainable Manufacturing – Shaping Global Value Creation  
Funded by German Research Foundation (DFG)

# IPCC reports are the result of extensive work of many scientists from around the world

1 Summary for Policymakers

1 Technical Summary


235 Authors

900 Reviewers

More than 2000 pages

Close to 10,000 references


More than 38,000 comments



## **GHG emissions growth has accelerated despite reduction efforts.**




GHG emissions growth between 2000 and 2010 has been larger than in the previous three decades.



Based on IPCC Figure 1.3


# Regional patterns of GHG emissions are shifting along with changes in the world economy.

## GHG Emissions by Country Group and Economic Sector




Based on Figure 1.6

# GHG emissions rise with growth in GDP and population; long-standing trend of decarbonisation of energy reversed.




# No Leapfrogging of energy carriers: Evidence for a renaissance of coal



Steckel, Edehofer, Jakob, submitted to PNAS

# No leapfrogging of economic structures: The product space


Resource Cluster




Manufacturing sectors seem to be unevitable for economic development

- Products
- Processed Food
- Textile and Wearing Apparel
- Light Manufacturing
- Heavy Manufacturing
- Other Services
- Utilities and Construction
- Transport and Communication

Industry/Service Cluster (developed countries)



Agriculture Cluster (poor countries)




Bridges

(countries in transition)

Radebach et al

# Poor countries follow emission pathways of rich countries



Historic patterns of CO<sub>2</sub> per capita emissions and GDP per capita seem to be replicated by today's developing countries.




Shaping Global Value Creation

**Limiting warming to 2°C involves substantial technological, economic and institutional challenges.**



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**Without additional mitigation, global mean surface temperature is projected to increase by 3.7 to 4.8°C over the 21<sup>st</sup> century.**



Based on WGII AR5 Figure 19.4

# Observed impacts of climate change are widespread and consequential.



## Biological systems



## Physical systems




## Human and managed systems




## Confidence in attribution to climate change




# Stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations requires moving away from the baseline, regardless of the mitigation goal.



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
# Stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations requires moving away from the baseline, regardless of the mitigation goal.



## Global costs to stabilize the climate are comparably moderate




# Global costs rise with the ambition of the mitigation goal.



Based on Table SPM.2

# Availability of technology can greatly influence mitigation costs.



Based on Figure 6.24


**Low stabilization scenarios are dependent upon a full decarbonization of energy supply in the long term.**




# In low CO<sub>2</sub> concentration stabilization scenarios, fossil fuel use without CCS is phased out in the long-term.

## b) Electricity Generation



Electricity Shares  
(Three Illustrative Scenarios)



Electricity Shares  
(AR5 Scenarios)




Total Electricity Supply  
(AR5 Scenarios)




Based on Figure 7.15b

# Decarbonization of energy supply is a key requirement for limiting warming to 2°C.




Based on Figure 7.11

# Energy demand reductions can provide flexibility, hedge against risks, avoid lock-in and provide co-benefits.



Based on Figure 7.11


# Baseline scenarios suggest rising GHG emissions in all sectors, except for CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the land use sector.



Based on Figure TS.17

# Mitigation requires changes throughout the economy. Systemic approaches are expected to be most effective.


450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq with Carbon Dioxide Capture & Storage



Based on Figure TS.17

# Mitigation efforts in one sector determine efforts in others.

450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq without Carbon Dioxide Capture & Storage




Based on Figure TS.17

**Effective mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents advance their own interests independently.**




# Substantial reductions in emissions would require large changes in investment patterns and appropriate policies.




Based on IPCC Figure 16.3

# There is far more carbon in the ground than emitted in any baseline scenario.



Based on SRREN Figure 1.7

# The emerging schemes of global carbon pricing




IPCC, Figure 13.4


- Globally uniform emission price optimal to address global externality
- This would require global cooperation; hampered by free-riding
- Nevertheless, some recent regional advances to carbon pricing

# Dynamic cost-effectiveness of ETS is lacking

- Declining CO<sub>2</sub> price
- Currently , no substantial price increase expected for 2020 (only little spread between nearest contract and future contract for 2020)



# Empirical evaluation of price drivers of EU emission allowances




- Only 10% of price formation can be explained by market fundamentals (renewable deployment, economic crisis, CDM, ...)
- But when taking into consideration policy events dummies (e.g. backloading vote) explanatory power jumps from 10% to 44%.
- In the situation with the non-binding cap, the standard price formation does not work


# Dynamic cost-effectiveness of ETS is lacking

- Consider the price in 2020 as a benchmark for evaluating dynamic cost-effectiveness of the ETS
- There is a gap between expectations and models that suggest a cost-effective price higher than 20€ / tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2020

## EUA nearest contract and Futures 2020



## Cost-effective CO<sub>2</sub> price from modeling



Knopf et al. (2013)

## Using climate policy to realize co-benefits for broader sustainability goals



# Massive infrastructure investments are needed globally.



- Telecommunication




- Access to electricity




- Water availability

# Mitigation can result in large co-benefits for human health and other societal goals.



Based on IPCC Figures 6.33 and 12.23


# Infrastructure investment



Jakob and Edenhofer, submitted

- Achieve universal energy access by 2030: US\$ 36-41 bln per year (Riahi et al. 2012)
- “Great convergence” of global health standards by 2035: about US\$ 40 bln per year (Jameson et al. 2013) data from 2009, Source: WDI online

# The carbon rent: Emission pricing revenues could overcompensate profit losses of fossil fuel owners.



- Fossil resource rents decrease with climate policy ambition
- For a globally optimal carbon price, over-compensation by carbon rent (=permit price or tax \* emissions)
- Carbon rent appropriated domestically via auctioned permits or tax
- Receipts from a CO<sub>2</sub>-tax or auctioning could be used to lower taxes, for investments in infrastructure or to reduce debts



Shaping Global Value Creation

**Thank you**

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
CRC 1026 Sustainable Manufacturing – Shaping Global Value Creation  
Funded by German Research Foundation (DFG)

## Additional slides

# Delaying mitigation increases the difficulty and narrows the options for limiting warming to 2°C.

Before 2030


GHG Emissions Pathways [GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr]



# Delaying mitigation increases the difficulty and narrows the options for limiting warming to 2°C.


## Before 2030

GHG Emissions Pathways [GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr]



## After 2030


Rate of CO<sub>2</sub> Emission Change [%/yr]



# Delaying mitigation increases the difficulty and narrows the options for limiting warming to 2°C.


## Before 2030

GHG Emissions Pathways [GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr]




## After 2030

Rate of CO<sub>2</sub> Emission Change [%/yr]




Share of Low Carbon Energy [%]



# Delaying mitigation is estimated to increase the difficulty and narrow the options for limiting warming to 2°C.

Before 2030

GHG Emissions Pathways [GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr]




“Delayed mitigation”

“Immediate action”

# Delaying mitigation is estimated to increase the difficulty and narrow the options for limiting warming to 2°C.


## Before 2030

GHG Emissions Pathways [GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr]




## After 2030

Rate of CO<sub>2</sub> Emission Change [%/yr]




Share of Low Carbon Energy [%]




## Before 2030

GHG Emissions Pathways [GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq/yr]




## After 2030


Rate of CO<sub>2</sub> Emission Change [%/yr]



Share of Low Carbon Energy [%]



**Current Cancun Pledges imply increased mitigation challenges for reaching 2°C.**



Based on Figures 6.32 and 7.16