





# Welcome to the Climate Casino!

$$\text{\$} \times 10$$

$$\text{leaf} = 1 \times \text{\$}$$

$$\text{dice} \times \text{disaster}$$

# A Climate Casino




 =  +1



 =  -2


 =  -all

# A Climate Casino

$$\text{House icon} = 1 \times \$$$

$$1 \times \text{House icon} \checkmark \begin{array}{|c|} \hline \bullet \bullet \\ \hline \bullet \bullet \end{array} \begin{array}{|c|} \hline \bullet \bullet \bullet \\ \hline \bullet \bullet \end{array}$$

$$3 \times \text{House icon} \checkmark \begin{array}{|c|} \hline \bullet \bullet \\ \hline \bullet \bullet \bullet \bullet \end{array}$$

# Game starts

**Round 1:**



× 9



× 1

**Dice :**




**Token:**



× 10

# Game starts

**Round 2:**



**Dice :**



**Token:**



# Game starts

**Round 3:**




**× 9**



**× 1**

**Dice :**



**Token:**



**× 10**

# What if?


$$\text{\$} \times 3$$

$$\begin{array}{|c|} \hline \bullet & \bullet \\ \hline \bullet & \bullet \\ \hline \end{array} \begin{array}{|c|} \hline \bullet & \bullet & \bullet \\ \hline \bullet & & \bullet \\ \hline \end{array} \begin{array}{|c|} \hline \bullet & \bullet & \bullet & \bullet \\ \hline \bullet & \bullet & \bullet & \bullet \\ \hline \end{array} = \text{ear of wheat} - \text{all}$$


# Effects of climate disaster reduction measures

Economic activity  
such as GDP.

Society A



Society B



Infrastructure  
for production




Infra. for disaster  
risk reduction



# Integrating risk reduction and risk finance

Economic activity  
such as GDP.



# SMART-SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR ADDRESSING PHYSICAL AND FISCAL RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

QINHAN ZHU

MUNETA YOKOMATSU

STEFAN HOCHRAINER-STIGLER


REINHARD MECHLER

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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS



# Analyse multi-hazard risks under different scenarios

- Model: CLIMADA
- Case study: Madagascar
- Covered hazards: tropical cyclones, riverine flood, coastal flood



# Physical risks in Madagascar

- Average Annual Losses considering cyclones and flood:
  - General assets: 30 million \$
  - Public assets: 16.8 million \$
  - Agriculture : 4.6 million \$
- 50-year compound event: 521 million \$ (2.7% of total assets, 3.8% of GDP)



# Risk Reduction

- Physical: Storm-reinforced Housing (wood and unreinforced masonry housings make up 78% of all residential land area (Madagascar evidence))
- Natural: Bamboo T-fence (global evidence)


Option for retrofitting	AAL after retrofitting (AAL2)	Benefit of retrofitting (AAL1-AAL2)
Wood only	48.5	8.0
Unreinforced Masonry (UM) only	42.0	15.5
Both wood and UM	33.0	24.4

Estimated benefits of enforcing higher building code, unit: million \$


# Effects of disaster risk reduction measures:

Exceedance probability


(=1 – “Value of distribution function of damage”)



# Stock formation process: Production capital and DRR stock



# Layered strategy: combining risk reduction and risk finance





# CatSim: Fiscal-centered macroeconomic modelling

	Independent of disaster occurrence	At disaster time
Revenue	<p>Tax, Grant from donor countries, Other revenues (including dividends from state companies), Seigniorage (i.e., income from printing money, technically by the central bank)</p>	<p>Income from Disaster finance contracts:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Withdrawal from Reserve fund</li> <li>2) Contingent credit</li> <li>3) Insurance claim</li> <li>4) Income of ART</li> </ol>
Expenditure	<p>Gov. consumption, Investment in Prod. capital and DRR stocks, Interest payment of debt, Annual expenditure for Disaster finance:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Transfer to Dis. Reserve stock,</li> <li>2) Fee for credit line contract,</li> <li>3) Insurance premium,</li> <li>4) payments for alternative risk transfer (ART)</li> </ol>	<p>Prompt reconstruction of Prod. capital and DRR stocks, Relief good supply</p>

# Debt sustainability and default

- Process of government's financial position: in terms of sovereign debt

$$\text{Debt (Year } t+1) = \text{Debt (Year } t) + \text{Expenditure (} t) - \text{Revenue (} t)$$

- Index that serves as the criterion  
Debt-GDP ratio

$$x_D(t) := \frac{\text{Debt}(t)}{\text{Nominal GDP}(t)}$$

Assumption: national government is subjected to

$$x_D(t) < \bar{x}_D.$$

$\bar{x}_D$ : Constant value of the limitation of the debt-GDP ratio

# Index focused for policy evaluation

- GDP growth rate

$\gamma_{YAT}$  : The average annual real-GDP growth rate over the planning period (T years)

Example)

- Expected growth rate and its variance

In the numerical simulation, run the model many times with many disaster scenarios over the planning period (i.e., “Monte-Carlo simulation”), and obtain

[Expected level of  $\gamma_{YAT}$ ] : the mean over the tested disaster scenarios,

[Variance of  $\gamma_{YAT}$ ]: the size of distribution, which reflects uncertainty of growth.

# Policy evaluation

## ➤ Evaluation function

$$F(\text{Policy}) = [\text{Expected level of } \gamma_{YAT}] - [\text{Weight}] \times [\text{Variance of } \gamma_{YAT}]$$

- ✓  $\gamma_{YAT}$  : The average annual real-GDP growth rate over the planning period (T years)
- ✓ Each set of Policy is input to be evaluated by the function.
- ✓ Degree of risk aversion is represented by the value of [Weight].
- ✓ NOTE: In stead of focusing on the growth rate, the objective function could also be

$$\max_{\text{Policy}} F_{\text{GDP}}(\text{Policy}) = E[\text{GDP}(t)] - \nu_{\text{GDP}} \cdot \text{Var}[\text{GDP}(t)].$$

## ➤ Problem formulation

Maximize  $F(\text{Policy})$  with respect to Policy,

Subject to

“Net external debts (at the national level) must be smaller than the certain level.”

# Sample of the results


- Data collection is ongoing in Madagascar
- Policy variables
  - ✓  $\theta_S$  : Investment rate in DRR (disaster mitigation) infrastructure; in terms of the GDP share
  - ✓  $\xi_{KS}$  : The ratio of Government's prompt investment for reconstruction to the total destroyed physical capital within the disaster year
  - ✓  $\omega_I$  : The insurance-coverage rate against the total prompt needs of resources (= the total stock damage and the relief supply)

# Sample of the results (Cont'd)

## ➤ Environment

Mark-up rate of the insurance: MUR=1.0,1.5,2.0,2.5

MUR	1	1.5	2	2.5
Optimal set of policies				
Inv. rate in DRR	0.0371	0.0457	0.0457	0.0371
Gov. recovery rate	1	0.6	0.6	0.4
Insurance cov. rate	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.2
Results				
Value of Eva. function	0.0786	0.0468	0.0448	0.0382
Expected average growth rate	0.0898	0.0715	0.0701	0.0534
Variance of growth rate	0.000112	0.000247	0.000253	0.000152




Mean path of real GDP

### Policy variables

- ✓  $\theta_S$  : Investment rate in DRR (disaster mitigation) infrastructure; in terms of the GDP share
- ✓  $\xi_{KS}$ : The ratio of Government's prompt investment for reconstruction to the total destroyed physical capital within the disaster year
- ✓  $\omega_I$ : The insurance-coverage rate against the total prompt needs of resources (= the total stock damage and the relief supply)

# Sample of the results (Cont'd)

- Sample path (under one process of random arrivals of disasters) of the case  $MUR=2.0$  and the optimal policy set



# Sample of the results (Cont'd)

## ➤ Sensitivity analyses

Basic case

MUR	1	1.5	2	2.5
Optimal set of policies				
Inv. rate in DRR	0.0371	0.0457	0.0457	0.0371
Gov. recovery rate	1	0.6	0.6	0.4
Insurance cov. rate	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.2
Results				
Value of Eva. function	0.0786	0.0468	0.0448	0.0382
Expected average growth rate	0.0898	0.0715	0.0701	0.0534
Variance of growth rate	0.000112	0.000247	0.000253	0.000152

### 1. More strict default threshold: 0.8->0.5

MUR	1	1.5	2	2.5
Optimal set of policies				
Inv. rate in DRR	0.0500	0.0414	0.0329	0.0371
Gov. recovery rate	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.2
Insurance cov. rate	0.8	0.6	0	0.2
Results				
Value of Eva. function	0.0490	0.0252	0.0268	0.0160
Expected average growth rate	0.0778	0.0507	0.0527	0.0447
Variance of growth rate	0.000288	0.000255	0.00026	0.000287

Less expenditure for recovery investment

### 2. Increasing damage rate due to climate change

MUR	1	1.5	2	2.5
Optimal set of policies				
Inv. rate in DRR	0.0329	0.0500	0.0500	0.0457
Gov. recovery rate	1	0.8	0.6	0
Insurance cov. rate	1	0.2	0.2	0.2
Results				
Value of Eva. function	0.0596	0.0423	0.0469	0.0218
Expected average growth rate	0.0802	0.0713	0.0729	0.0435
Variance of growth rate	0.000206	0.000290	0.000260	0.000217

Larger preparedness



# Most critical component: Estimation of the interest rate function

## ➤ Interest rate function

$$i(x_D(t), \{\Omega_{hI}(t) | \text{for all } h\}, P(t)Y(t)) := \begin{cases} r(t) & \text{if } x_D(t) \leq \bar{x}_r \\ r(t) \cdot \{1 + a_{i1}\tilde{x}_D(t) + a_{i2}\tilde{x}_D(t)^2 + a_{i3}\varepsilon_i(t)\} & \text{if } x_D(t) > \bar{x}_r \end{cases}$$

where

$$\tilde{x}_D(t) := x_D(t) - a_{i0} \frac{\sum_h \Omega_{hI}(t)}{P(t)Y(t)} = \frac{D(t) - a_{i0} \sum_h \Omega_{hI}(t)}{P(t)Y(t)}$$

$r(t)$ : risk free interest rate in market,  $x_D(t)$ : the sovereign debt-GDP ratio,  $\bar{x}_r$ : threshold value

$\sum_h \Omega_{hI}(t)$ : sum of insurance claims, representing the total scale of insurance contract


$\varepsilon_i(t)$ : truncated standard normal random variable:  $0 \leq \varepsilon_i(t) \leq 1$

$\bar{x}_r, a_{i0}, a_{i1}, a_{i2}, a_{i3}$ : parameters to be estimated by data.

In the numerical examples, it was found that giving a small positive value to  $a_{i2}$  results in explosion of the interest rate and the sovereign debt-GDP ratio.

# MILEFA NY FOSSA, TOJO NY KARY?

TO ESCAPE FROM THE FOSSA  
BUT MEET A WILD CAT



# THANK YOU!

QINHAN ZHU

MUNETA YOKOMATSU

STEFAN HOCHRAINER-STIGLER

REINHARD MECHLER

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