

Global change scenarios

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Global change scenarios

- **Some definitions**
- **Classifying global change scenarios**
- **Examples of global-scale scenarios**
- **Examples of regional scenarios**
- **Dealing with uncertainties**

Some definitions

What is global change?

- Long-term changes in the environment affecting many or all areas of the globe

and

- Long-term changes in the driving factors of environmental change, which are also global in extent

Examples of global environmental change

- atmospheric composition changes
- eutrophication of waters
- stratospheric ozone depletion
- climate change
- sea-level rise
- land degradation and desertification

Drivers of global change can be:

- **Natural** - processes in the environment (e.g. climatic fluctuations, erosion and sedimentation, ice dynamics, volcanoes, solar variations, population dynamics)
- **Anthropogenic** - relating to human activity (e.g. demographic trends, economic development, land use change, fossil fuel combustion, industrial processes, agriculture)

Examples of the global driving factors of environmental change

- demographic change (human population)
- socio-economic development
- technological change
- land cover/land use change

What are scenarios?

"A scenario is a coherent, internally consistent and plausible description of a possible future state of the world" (IPCC, 1994)

Scenarios are:

- alternative images of how the future can unfold
- not forecasts or predictions
- important tools for assessing future developments in complex systems with high uncertainties

Who needs scenarios?

- **Scientists** need projections of global change to assess impacts and adaptive capacity
- **Policy makers** need projections to assist in formulating appropriate responses to global change (and see Alcamo, 2001)
- The **general public** needs to be informed about prospective global changes

Not all impact/vulnerability assessments require scenarios

For example:

- **Assessing vulnerability to climate change by studying adaptive capacity under present-day climate variability**

Use of environmental information by impact/adaptation researchers?

Two alternative approaches:

- Prognostic approach
- Diagnostic approach


Prognostic approach

Select one or more projections of the future for assessing impacts


Question: *"If the environment changes like this, what will the impacts be?"*

Conventional "top-down" approach - results are highly dependent on the specific scenarios selected.

Top-down approach



***"If you wanna know how vulnerable you are
then tell me how the environment will change"***




Diagnostic approach


Select a wide range of projections for conducting sensitivity analyses

Question: *"What types of changes are needed to produce a given impact?"*

Less common, "bottom-up" approach - accounts for a range of uncertainties in projections; can provide insights into policy questions

"No scenarios please, we're already vulnerable"





Classifying global change scenarios

Broad scenario types

1. Exploratory (descriptive) scenarios

Describe how the future might unfold based on known processes of change and extrapolations of past trends

Include "business-as-usual" scenarios, but can also describe bifurcations or other assumptions about regulation or adaptation

2. Normative (prescriptive) scenarios

Describe a prespecified future; a world achievable (or avoidable) only through certain actions

Includes "worst case" scenarios and "target-based" scenarios, often requiring "back casting"

Scenarios may be required for:

- **Illustrating global change** (e.g. regional analogues of projected climate)
- **Communicating potential consequences of global change** (e.g. vegetation shift; species at risk)
- **Strategic planning** (e.g. design of coastal or river flood defences)
- **Guiding emissions control policy** (e.g. alternative options for achieving atmospheric composition targets)
- **Methodological purposes** (e.g. new scenario development techniques; impact model evaluation)

Examples of global-scale scenarios

**Branch Points:
Global Scenarios and Human Choice**
Gilberto Gallopin, Al Hammond, Paul Raskin and Rob Swart

A Resource Paper of the *Global Scenario Group*



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1997

ISSN: 1400-7155
ISBN: 91 88714 39 X

Gallopín et al., 1997

**Bending the Curve:
Toward Global Sustainability**

Paul Raskin, Gilberto Gallopin, Pablo Gutman, Al Hammond and Rob Swart

A report of the *Global Scenario Group*



PoleStar Series Report no. 8, 1998



Raskin et al., 1998

Great Transition
The Promise and Lure of the Times Ahead



PAUL RASKIN
TARIQ BANURI
GILBERTO GALLOPIN
PABLO GUTMAN
AL HAMMOND
ROBERT KATES
ROB SWART










Raskin et al., 2002

Three archetypal scenarios of the future

- **Conventional Worlds:** current trends play out without major discontinuity and surprise in the evolution of institutions, environmental systems and human values.
- **Barbarization:** fundamental social change occurs, but is unwelcome, bringing great human misery and collapse of civilized norms.
- **Great Transitions:** fundamental social transformation but to a new and arguably higher stage of human civilization.

Gallopín *et al.*, 1997

Scenarios structure with illustrative patterns of change

Class Variant	 Population	 Economy	 Environment	 Equity	 Technology	 Conflict
Conventional Worlds						
<i>Reference</i>						
<i>Policy Reform</i>						
Barberization						
<i>Breakdown</i>						
<i>Fortress world</i>						
Great Transitions						
<i>Eco-communalism</i>						
<i>New sustainability paradigm</i>						

Gallopín et al., 1997

The IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES)

The SRES scenarios

Purpose: to represent the range of driving forces and emissions in the scenario literature

Scenario characteristics:

Extensive literature assessment and "open" process


Four preliminary marker scenarios: no more or less likely than other scenarios

Exclude outlying "surprise" or "disaster" scenarios

Exclude additional climate policy initiatives (UNFCCC)

Six integrated assessment models employed

The SRES driving forces and storylines



Nakicenovic *et al.* (2000)

Relative direction of global driving forces for the SRES illustrative scenarios


Scenario	Population	Economy	Environment	Equity	Technology	Globalization
A1FI						
A1B						
A1T						
B1						
A2						
B2						


IPCC (2000)

The SRES illustrative scenarios: primary driving forces


Family			A1		A2	B1	B2
Scenario group	1990	A1FI	A1B	A1T	A2	B1	B2
Population (billion)	5.3						
2020		7.6	7.5	7.6	8.2	7.6	7.6
2050		8.7	8.7	8.7	11.3	8.7	9.3
2100		7.1	7.1	7.0	15.1	7.0	10.4
World GDP (10 ¹² 1990 US\$/yr)	21						
2020		53	56	57	41	53	51
2050		164	181	187	82	136	110
2100		525	529	550	243	328	235
Per capita income ratio	16.1						
2020		7.5	6.4	6.2	9.4	8.4	7.7
2050		2.8	2.8	2.8	3.6	3.6	4.0
2100		1.5	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.8	3.0

Nakicenovic *et al.* (2000)





Reasons for Concern



- I Risks to Unique and Threatened Systems
- II Risks from Extreme Climate Events
- III Distribution of Impacts
- IV Aggregate Impacts
- V Risks from Future Large-Scale Discontinuities

Other features of the SRES scenarios


- **Non-intervention, baseline scenarios, but ...**
- **Some scenarios resemble mitigation scenarios**

SRES "surrogate" stabilisation (CO₂ only) scenarios

- **B1 approximates 550 ppm stabilisation**
- **B2 and A1T approximate 650 ppm stabilisation**
- **A1B approximates 750 ppm stabilisation**


Swart et al. (2002)

Global mean temperature changes for a stabilisation of CO₂ concentration at different levels from 450-1000 ppm




Cubasch *et al.* (2001)

Reducing risks: mitigation




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
Reducing risks: mitigation



Reducing risks: mitigation




Reducing risks: mitigation




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Reducing risks: mitigation



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Reducing risks: mitigation




Some examples of global scale applications of the SRES scenarios

28.10.2005




Population Size: Global




Source: O'Neill, 2005

Numbers of people at risk of hunger for the four SRES marker scenarios assuming no climate change



Source: Parry et al. (2004)


CO₂ concentrations projected for the 21st century




IPCC, 2001

HadCM3-derived mean annual temperature change (°C) under A2-forcing

2041-2070




2071-2100



Source: IPCC Data Distribution Centre.



Potential changes (%) in cereal yields: 2020s, 2050s and 2080s (w.r.t. 1990) under the HadCM3 SRES A2a scenario

With direct CO₂
effects



Source: Parry et al. (2004)


Additional numbers of people at risk of hunger under seven SRES scenarios, relative to the reference (no climate change)



Abrupt global changes


Scenarios or thought experiments?

Modelled change in surface air temperature during years 20-30 after the collapse of the THC (HadCM3)




Vellinga and Wood, 2002

Change in biomass (kg/m^2) (mean of last 10 years) for a weakening THC "scenario" relative to the control.



Extreme sea-level rise scenarios: EU Atlantis project



Nicholls et al. (2005); Tol et al. (2005)

Regional and local scenarios

Why are regional scenarios needed?

- To provide vital information not available from global scenarios
- To match the spatial scale of impact/vulnerability assessments (e.g. continental, national, river catchment, commune, site)
- To capture high temporal resolution information (e.g. flood peaks, storm surges, pollution episodes, urban effects)

Some general scenario requirements for integrated regional impact studies


- Constructed for a **relevant** set of climate and non-climate changes
- Internally **consistent**, mutually consistent and physically plausible
- Projected over an appropriate **time horizon**
- Of a sufficient spatial and temporal **resolution**
- Representative of the range of **uncertainty** in projections, including non-linear events
- Consider **changes in variability** as well as **mean conditions**

Some examples of integrated regional scenarios

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Vulnerability assessment of ecosystem services for Europe

ATEAM (Advanced Terrestrial Ecosystem Analysis and Modelling)



Schröter et al. 2005 (submitted)

Ecosystem services and indicators

ATEAM (Advanced Terrestrial Ecosystem Analysis and Modelling)

Sectors	Services	Indicators
Agriculture	Food & fibre production Bioenergy production	■ Agricultural land area (Farmer livelihood) ■ Suitability of crops ■ Biomass energy yield
Forestry	Wood production	■ Tree productivity: growing stock & increment
Carbon storage	Climate protection	■ Carbon storage in vegetation ■ Carbon storage in soil
Water	Water supply (drinking, irrigation, hydropower) Drought & flood prevention	■ Runoff quality and quantity ■ Runoff seasonality
Biodiversity	Beauty Life support processes (e.g. pollination)	■ Species richness and turnover (plants, mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibian) ■ Shifts in suitable habitats
Mountains	Tourism (e.g. winter sports) Recreation	■ Snow (elevation of snow line)

Schröter et al. 2005 (submitted)

European agricultural land use drivers

ATEAM (Advanced Terrestrial Ecosystem Analysis and Modelling)

Policy	Socio-economics	
	Demand	Supply
Market intervention (subsidies, quotas)	Population (consumption)	Resource competition (e.g. urban)
Rural development (LFAs ^a)	Consumer preferences (meat, organic)	Climate change (temperature, precipitation, CO ₂)
Environmental policy (NVZs ^b , ESAs ^c)	Market liberalisation (WTO ^d)	Technology and management
	European Union enlargement	

^a Less favoured areas.

^b Nitrate vulnerable zones.

^c Environmentally sensitive areas.

^d World trade organisation.

Rounsevell et al. 2005

Estimated relative effect of different drivers on cropland in Europe

Demand for agricultural goods

Scenario	Cropland		
	2020	2050	2080
A1FI ^a	1.25	1.51	1.46
A2 ^b	1.14	1.31	1.38
B1 ^c	1.18	1.39	1.29
B2 ^d	1.06	1.09	1.07

Assumed effects of technology (yield)

Scenario	Cropland		
	2020	2050	2080
A1FI ^a	1.37	1.87	2.34
A2 ^b	1.36	1.81	2.16
B1 ^c	1.29	1.62	1.86
B2 ^d	1.19	1.27	1.27

Assumed effects of CO₂ (yield)

Scenario	2020	2050	2080
A1FI ^a	1.04	1.16	1.32
A2 ^b	1.04	1.13	1.27
B1 ^c	1.04	1.09	1.11
B2 ^d	1.04	1.11	1.15

^a Global economic and fossil fuel intensive world.

^b Regional economic world.

^c Global environmental world.


^d Regional environmental world.

Estimated effects of climate change (yield)

Scenario	Cropland		
	2020	2050	2080
A1FI ^a	0.99	0.92	0.93
A2 ^b	1.01	0.97	0.95
B1 ^c	1.01	0.98	0.97
B2 ^d	1.01	0.98	0.97

Rounsevell et al. 2005

Modelled cropland areas in Europe in 2080: alternative storyline assumptions, HadCM3 climate




ATEAM

Rounsevell et al. 2005

28.10.2005

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


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


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


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Modelled cropland areas in Europe in 2080: alternative GCM-based climates, A2 storyline




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


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


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Modelled cropland areas in Europe in 2080: alternative GCM-based climates, A2 storyline



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
Rounsevell et al. 2005

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National-scale example: **FIN****SKEN** scenarios


- Based on IPCC SRES global scenarios
- Use available models/information
- Use model results and expert judgement
- Combine elements of social and natural science
- Internally- and mutually-consistent
- Focus on the entire 21st century: 2001-2100
- Geographically explicit in Finland
- Consider uncertainties in projections

Population of Finland: 1990-2100 Downscaled from the SRES global scenarios




Source: CIESIN (2002)

Gross Domestic Product of Finland: 1990-2100 Downscaled from the SRES global scenarios




Source: CIESIN (2002)

Projected temperature and precipitation change in Finland by the 2020s relative to 1961-1990: winter and spring




Jylhä et al., 2004

Projected temperature and precipitation change in Finland by the 2050s relative to 1961-1990: winter and spring



Jylhä et al., 2004


Projected temperature and precipitation change in Finland by the 2080s relative to 1961-1990: winter and spring



Jylhä et al., 2004

Mean sea level at Vaasa, C. Finland, 1920-2000

Observed: annual and 15-yr running means




Source: Johansson et al., 2004

Mean sea level at Vaasa, C. Finland, 1920-2100

Observed: annual and 15-yr running means


Projected: SRES scenarios and uncertainty bounds



Source: Johansson et al., 2004

Mean sea level at Hanko, S. Finland, 1880-2000

Observed: annual and 15-yr running means




Source: Johansson et al., 2004

Mean sea level at Hanko, S. Finland, 1880-2100


Observed: annual and 15-yr running means

Projected: SRES scenarios and uncertainty bounds



Source: Johansson et al., 2004


Ozone exposure of forests at Ähtäri (AOT40 forest April-September)




Laurila et al., 2004

Deposition plots for south and north Finland

Sulphur



Nitrogen



© Finsken scenario gateway, SYKE, EMEP/MSC-W, FMI, University of Kassel, IPCC.


FINSKEN 2020s			A1FI	A2	B1	B2	
Popul Presen	FINSKEN 2050s		A1FI	A2	B1	B2	
Gross Presen	Popul Presen	FINSKEN 2080s		A1FI	A2	B1	B2
CO ₂ c Presen	Gross Presen	Population change (%) Present (2000): 5.2 million		−3.4	+11.5	−3.4	−0.9
Mean Baseli	CO ₂ c Presen	Gross Domestic Product change (%) Present (2000): 170 billion US1990\$		+370	+253	+228	+139
Annua Baseli	Mean Baseli	CO ₂ concentration (ppm) Present (2000): 367 ppm		821	718	535	567
Sea le Relati	Annua Baseli	Mean annual temperature change (°C) Baseline (1961-1990)		5.6 – 7.4	4.4 – 5.9	2.4 – 4.4	3.0 – 5.0
Ozone 1996-2 1996-2	Sea le Relati	Annual precipitation change (%) Baseline: 1961-1990		14 – 37	8 – 29	8 – 23	6 – 28
S depo 1998: 1998:	Ozone 1996-2 1996-2	Sea level change (cm) Relative to 2000 (S. Finland)		+1	−3	−10	−8
N depo 1998: 1998: 1998:	S depo 1998: 1998: 1998:	Ozone exposure (ppb.h) 1996-2000: 2100 ppb.h 1996-2000: 4600 ppb.h	(N. Finland) (S. Finland)	- -	- -	- -	- -
	N depo 1998: 1998:	S deposition (gm ⁻² a ⁻¹) 1998: 0.30 gm ⁻² a ⁻¹ 1998: 0.75 gm ⁻² a ⁻¹	(N. Finland) (S. Finland)	0.21 0.61	0.13 0.35	0.10 0.22	0.09 0.24
		N deposition (gm ⁻² a ⁻¹) 1998: 0.17 gm ⁻² a ⁻¹ 1998: 0.37 gm ⁻² a ⁻¹	(N. Finland) (S. Finland)	0.31 0.60	0.24 0.46	0.08 0.15	0.17 0.32

Carter et al., 2004


Regional scenarios: some issues

- "Top-down" or "bottom-up"?
- Relationships to global scenarios (downscaling)
- Storylines, their interpretation and quantification
- Scenario linkages, consistency and integration
- Regional relevance

Dealing with uncertainties




Propagation of uncertainties



28.10.2005



SYKE




**The “uncertainty cascade”
(New and Hulme, 2000)**

**The “uncertainty explosion”
(Henderson-Sellers, 1993)**


Can we express our projections of the future probabilistically?

Probability distributions of climate sensitivity (weighted PDFs based on a model reliability index)




Source: Murphy et al., 2004

Sensitivity matrix showing probability of exceeding threshold irrigation level for pasture in northern Victoria



Jones, 2000


Probability distribution of expected regional warming by 2070 in inland Australia based on Monte Carlo sampling of 5 GCM outputs



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
Source: Jones, 2000

2000




Jones, 2000


2010




2020




2030




2040




2050




2060




2070




2080




2090



2100



Probability of exceeding irrigation threshold in > 50% years



28.10.2005

Probabilistic representations

- Numerous recent examples for projected climate, however ...
 - Usually conditional on the driving emissions scenario
 - Many alternative methods; all have subjective elements
- Recent examples for population projections
- Alternative views for socio-economic futures
- Useful for expressing impacts in terms of risk, but note
- No longer scenarios!



(Ensemble-based Predictions of Climate Changes and their Impacts)

FP6 Integrated Project began 1 Sep 2004

Some conclusions

- Scenarios can be used prescriptively or diagnostically
- A major role of scenarios is to illuminate uncertainties; they are NOT predictions
- The adoption of common driving factors is a prerequisite for ensuring consistency between global change scenarios
- Techniques to improve the spatial and temporal resolution of scenario information should be adopted only if they are truly appropriate in addressing the goals of the study
- Promising techniques are emerging for expressing projections in terms of probability and risk

Selected reading

Alcamo J. 2001. Scenarios as tools for international environmental assessment. *Environmental issue report* No 24, European Environment Agency, Luxembourg, 2001, 31 pp.

http://reports.eea.eu.int/environmental_issue_report_2001_24/en/issue_report_no_24.pdf

Alcamo, J., Leemans, R. and Kreileman, E. (eds.), 1998. *Global Change Scenarios of the 21st Century. Results from the IMAGE 2.1 Model*. Pergamon, London, 296 pp.

Carter T.R., La Rovere E.L., Jones R.N., Leemans R., Mearns L.O., Nakicenovic N., Pittock A.B., Semenov S.M. & Skea J. 2001. Developing and applying scenarios. In: McCarthy J.J., et al. (eds), *Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, pp. 145-190. http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/

IMAGE Team 2001. The IMAGE 2.2 implementation of the SRES scenarios: A comprehensive analysis of emissions, climate change and impacts in the 21st century. *RIVM CD-ROM publication 481508018*, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven, The Netherlands.

Nakicenovic N., Alcamo J., Davis G., de Vries B., Fenhann J., Gaffin S., Gregory K., Grübler A., Jung T.Y., Kram T., La Rovere E.L., Michaelis L., Mori S., Morita T., Pepper W., Pitcher H., Price L., Raihi K., Roehrl A., Rogner H.-H., Sankovski A., Schlesinger M., Shukla P., Smith S., Swart R., van Rooijen S., Victor N. & Dadi Z., 2000. *Emissions Scenarios. A Special Report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge University Press, 599 pp.
<http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/sres-e.pdf>


Parry M. (ed.) 2000. *Assessment of Potential Effects and Adaptations for Climate Change in Europe: The Europe ACACIA Project*, Jackson Environment Institute, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, 320 pp.

Parry M.L. 2002. Scenarios for climate impact and adaptation assessment. *Global Environmental Change* 12: 149--153.

Raskin, P., Gallopin, G., Gutman, P., Hammond, A. and Swart, R. 1998. *Bending the Curve: Toward Global Sustainability*. Global Scenario Group, Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm, 90 pp. plus appendices. <http://www.sei.se/pubs/dpubs.html>

Raskin, P., Banuri, T., Gallopin, G., Gutman, P., Hammond, A., Kates, R. and Swart, R. 2002. *Great Transition: The Promise and Lure of the Times Ahead*. SEI PoleStar Series Report no. 10, Global Scenario Group, Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm, 99 pp.
<http://www.sei.se/pubs/dpubs.html>





Final thought

"Everything is vague to a degree you do not realize till you have tried to make it precise."

Bertrand Russell (philosopher)