



POTSDAM INSTITUTE FOR  
CLIMATE IMPACT RESEARCH

Prof. Dr. Ottmar Edenhofer

# Challenges of International Climate Policy

Universität Graz, 7. Juni 2010




INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE



Working Group III  
Mitigation of Climate Change



# Projections of Global Mean Temperature




IPCC 2007

# Tipping Points in the Earth System



T. M. Lenton & H. J. Schellnhuber (Nature Reports Climate Change, 2007)


# Burning Embers




Potential policy-relevant tipping elements that could be triggered by global warming this century, with shading indicating their uncertain thresholds. For each threshold, the transition from white to yellow indicates a lower bound on its proximity, and the transition from yellow to red, an upper bound. The degree of uncertainty is represented by the spread of the colour transition.

T. M. Lenton & H. J. Schellnhuber (Nature Reports Climate Change, 2007)

# World Map of Wealth




## Capital stock per person




Source: Füssel (2007)

# World Map of Carbon Debt




Carbon emissions per person from fossil fuel burning (1950-2003)



Source: *Füssel (2007)*


# Carbon Debt and Wealth







# What is the Optimal Level of Mitigation?




Economist's perspective:




# Different Perspectives




# Driving Forces



# Assessing the Solution Space




# Assessing the Solution Space




# The Economics of Atmospheric Stabilisation



3 stabilisation targets with different probabilities to reach the 2° target:  
550ppm-eq, 450ppm-eq, 400ppm-eq



# The Great Transformation



Based on IEA Data (1971-2005) and REMIND-R results for 450ppm-eq (ADAM); Graphic by Steckel/Knopf (PIK)



# Discounting and Technological Change



Primary Energy Consumption [EJ]

Pure Time Preference Rate 3%

Pure Time Preference Rate 1%



- Oil
- Natural Gas
- Coal w/o CCS
- Coal with CCS
- Nuclear
- Biomass w/o CCS
- Biomass with CCS
- Renewables w/o Biomass

Based on IEA Data (1971-2005) and REMIND results for 450ppm-eq (ADAM); Graphic by Steckel/Knopf

# There is more than one path towards a carbon-free economy

MERGE

TIMER

POLES




REMIND

E3MG

baseline

550 ppm


400 ppm




- nuclear
- biomass CCS
- biomass w/o CCS
- renew (solar,wind,hydro)
- fossil CCS
- fossil w/o CCS

*Knopf, Edenhofer et al. (2009)*

# There is more than one path towards a carbon-free economy




# Global Fossil Fuel Prices 1991 - 2008







Source: IMF International Commodities Database


# Renaissance of Coal



# Carbonization Pathways



# Mitigation Costs: Technology Options, 550ppm




*Knopf, Edenhofer et al. (2009)*

- ➔ Renewables and CCS are the most important options
- ➔ Ranking of options: Robust picture throughout all models

# Technology Options for Low Stabilisation




- high biomass potential
- with all options
- no nuclear beyond baseline
- low biomass potential
- no CCS
- no renewables beyond baseline



Knopf, Edenhofer et al. (2009)


# Technology Options for Low Stabilisation



*Knopf, Edenhofer et al. (2009)*

- ➔ 400 ppm neither achievable without CCS nor without an extension of renewables
- ➔ Biomass potential dominates the mitigation costs of low stabilisation
- ➔ Nuclear is not important beyond its (high) use in the baseline

# “Policy relevant but not policy prescriptive”



# International Environmental Agreements



- In many cases global climate policy implicitly assumes full international cooperation
- In reality: lack of a global authority  
instead: international environmental agreements (IEA)
- Participation is low whenever IEA (Barrett 1994) actually achieve something

Bali 2007



# Public Good Provision as a *Prisoners' Dilemma*



- Provision of a global Public Good:
  - (Same) benefits for everyone, say e.g. 5 (*per contributing party!*)
  - (Same) costs to contribute, say e.g. 7

- Game Structure of the ***Prisoners' Dilemma***:
  - Individual rationality for players to act selfishly
    - Incentive to *free-ride*
    - *Suboptimal outcome*

A 2x2 payoff matrix for a Prisoners' Dilemma game. The vertical axis is labeled 'Player 1' and the horizontal axis is labeled 'Player 2'. The rows for Player 1 are 'Abate' and 'Pollute'. The columns for Player 2 are 'Abate' and 'Pollute'. The payoffs are: (Abate, Abate) = (3, 3); (Abate, Pollute) = (5, -2); (Pollute, Abate) = (-2, 5); (Pollute, Pollute) = (0, 0). A red box highlights the (3, 3) outcome, and a blue box highlights the (0, 0) outcome. A red arrow points from (3, 3) to (5, -2), and a blue arrow points from (0, 0) to (-2, 5). A red '6' is written in the center of the matrix, representing the total benefit of 6 from mutual abatement.

		Player 2	
		Abate	Pollute
Player 1	Abate	3, 3	5, -2
	Pollute	-2, 5	0, 0

- If abating global warming resembles a Public Good, then climate negotiations will face a Prisoners' Dilemma

# Co-Benefits – An Assurance Game?



		<b>Player 2</b>	
		<i>Abate</i>	<i>Pollute</i>
<b>Player 1</b>	<i>Abate</i>	9 ← 8	5
	<i>Pollute</i>	8 ↑ 5	2 ↑ 2

- **Nash Equilibrium** and **Social Optimum** coincide

- Attempt to create focal point on Social Optimum:
  - ‘Co-Benefits of mitigation so high that unilateral abatement pays, irrespective of others’ decision’
- A mere issue of proper perception
- Co-Benefits matter, but really large enough to resolve PD automatically?
- The Hartwell-Paper argues that climate policy should be an indirect outcome of achieving Co-Benefits

# Public Good Provision as a *Prisoners' Dilemma*



Assurance Game

		Player 2	
		Abate	Pollute
Player 1	Abate	9, 9	8, 5
	Pollute	5, 8	2, 2

Arrows indicate best responses: Player 1's best response is to Abate (9 > 5), and Player 2's best response is to Abate (9 > 5). The (Abate, Abate) outcome (9, 9) is the Nash equilibrium.

Chicken Game

		Player 2	
		Abate	Pollute
Player 1	Abate	3, 3	5, -2
	Pollute	5, -2	-4, -4

Arrows indicate best responses: Player 1's best response is to Pollute (5 > 3), and Player 2's best response is to Pollute (-2 > -4). The (Pollute, Pollute) outcome (-4, -4) is the Nash equilibrium.

Prisoners' Dilemma

		Player 2	
		Abate	Pollute
Player 1	Abate	3, 3	5, -2
	Pollute	5, -2	0, 0

Arrows indicate best responses: Player 1's best response is to Pollute (5 > 3), and Player 2's best response is to Pollute (-2 > 0). The (Pollute, Pollute) outcome (0, 0) is the Nash equilibrium.


- Carraro: *Prisoners' Dilemma* (PD) –IEA→ *Chicken Game* (CG)
- Chicken Game shows partially cooperative behaviour


# The Challenge

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


- Can a clever design of environmental agreements achieve higher participation?
- Possibilities:
  - Promoting growth policy and new technologies
  - Trade restrictions
  - Permit trade with non-members of the agreement





# The Supply-side of Global Warming





Cumulative historic carbon consumption (1750-2004), estimated carbon stocks in the ground, and estimated future consumption (2005-2100) for business-as-usual (BAU) and ambitious 400-ppm-CO<sub>2</sub>-eq. scenario

Source: Kalkuhl, Edenhofer and Lessmann, 2009


# Lessons from the “Green Paradox”



- Increasing resource taxes change time path of net resource price
  - time-path of extraction is changed
  - Pigouvian taxes on emissions work similar to resource taxes



# Lessons from the “Green Paradox“



## Emissions trading scheme (ETS):

- Determines aggregated extraction path
- But leaves flexibility to resource owners:
  - What-flexibility: Coal, oil, gas, conventional/unconventional
  - When-flexibility: If intertemporal flexibility is implemented


→ How to determine caps?

→ How to organize intertemporal permit trade?

→ What happens to the resource rents?


... needs to be explored

# Regional Mitigation Costs: Winners and Losers



Edenhofer et al., 2009

# Domestic Cap and Trade: Linking Emerging CO<sub>2</sub>-Markets




**“The European Commission is preparing to call on the United States to create a trans-Atlantic system of carbon trading”**


# The Value of Early Action (REMIND)




- Delay of mitigation action until 2020 will increase global costs by 70%
- Stabilisation at 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub> is not feasible when delaying action until 2030




Source: RECIPE 2009




# R&D-Investment in Energy Technologies



Source: Updated version of IPCC (2007), AR4




# Market Prices for staple foods and crude oil monthly averages 1991 - 2008



Source: IMF; FAO International Commodity Prices

# Annual World Biofuel Production 1991 - 2008




Source: BP Statistical Energy Review; WRI





# Reducing Deforestation: Fossil vs. LUCF CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions

## CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per person and year, 1950 - 2003





CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production, and including land use change (kg C per person and year from 1950 - 2003)






# Mitigation and Adaptation






# Climate and socio-economic development




# Change in Agricultural Production



Climate-induced changes in agricultural production between 1990 and 2050

# Flood Risk by Sea Level Rise



Increase of population share threatend by sea level rise on an annual basis

