

A decade of weather extremes

Dim Coumou and Stefan Rahmstorf*

The ostensibly large number of recent extreme weather events has triggered intensive discussions, both in- and outside the scientific community, on whether they are related to global warming. Here, we review the evidence and argue that for some types of extreme — notably heatwaves, but also precipitation extremes — there is now strong evidence linking specific events or an increase in their numbers to the human influence on climate. For other types of extreme, such as storms, the available evidence is less conclusive, but based on observed trends and basic physical concepts it is nevertheless plausible to expect an increase.

For the United States, 2011 was a year of extreme weather, with 14 events that caused losses in excess of US\$1 billion each¹. The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration spoke of “a year seemingly full of weather extremes” after July had set new monthly heat records for Texas, Oklahoma and Delaware². The period from January to October was the wettest on record for several northeastern states, with wet soils contributing to the severe flooding when Hurricane Irene hit the region in August. During spring, the southern United States had been hit by the worst recorded tornado outbreak in history: April saw 753 tornadoes, beating the previous monthly record of 542 (from May 2003) by a large margin³. Other regions in the world were affected by extreme weather in 2011 as well: rainfall records were set in Australia, Japan and Korea, whereas the Yangtze Basin in China experienced record drought¹. In western Europe, spring was exceptionally hot and dry, setting records in several countries (Table 1)¹.

But 2011 was not unique: the past decade as a whole has seen an exceptional number of unprecedented extreme weather events, some causing major human suffering and economic damage⁴ (Table 1 and Fig. 1). In August 2010, the World Meteorological Organization issued a statement on the “unprecedented sequence of extreme weather events”, stating that it “matches Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projections of more frequent and more intense extreme weather events due to global warming”⁵. The Moscow heatwave and Pakistan flooding that year illustrated how destructive extreme weather can be to societies: the death toll in Moscow has been estimated at 11,000 and drought caused grain-harvest losses of 30%, leading the Russian government to ban wheat exports. At the same time Pakistan was hit by the worst flooding in its history, which affected approximately one-fifth of its total land area and 20 million people⁶.

The unprecedented meteorological events listed in Table 1 occurred in a decade that was likely the warmest globally for at least a millennium⁷. But are these two observations linked? We focus our discussion on the unprecedented extremes of the past decade, that is, those setting new meteorological records in the observational data available, because these often have the greatest impacts on societies, they grab the headlines and their uniqueness simplifies statistical analysis (compared with analysing extreme events exceeding a given threshold value). A much broader assessment of extreme events by the IPCC⁸ was published in March 2012. Unlike our Perspective, this has an emphasis on fixed-threshold extremes, model results and projections of the future, societal impacts and possible policy strategies to deal with extremes. Here, we ask the simpler question of whether the unprecedented extremes observed during the past decade are related to climatic warming. We start with some methodological remarks before discussing specific types of extreme.

Simple physical considerations

For some types of extreme, there are simple physical reasons why they would increase in a warming climate. If the average temperature rises, then obviously so will the number of heat records, all else remaining equal. Cold extremes will decrease, but if the probability distribution for temperature is shifted unchanged towards warmer conditions, the total number of extremes (hot plus cold) will increase⁹. That is fundamentally because what is considered extreme is always based on past experience, and a change in climate moves us out of the familiar range.

Warming will lead to more evaporation, too, and thus surface drying, increasing the intensity and duration of drought¹⁰. Warmer air can also be expected to enhance precipitation extremes as it can hold more moisture. According to the Clausius–Clapeyron equation, for each 1 °C of warming, saturated air contains 7% more water vapour, which may rain out if conditions are right. Increased atmospheric moisture content also provides more latent energy to drive storms. Furthermore, the potential intensity of tropical storms increases with warmer sea surface temperatures, all else remaining equal.

Such simple physical considerations thus lead us to expect certain weather extremes to increase in a warmer world. However, they are not sufficient to make firm predictions, because all else may not remain equal and a more detailed analysis is needed. First of all, to detect whether extremes have in fact increased, statistical analysis is required. For an attribution of extremes to a physical cause, modelling approaches can be used.

Statistics and the detection problem

Using statistics, scientists can analyse whether the number of recent extreme events is significantly larger than expected in a stationary (that is, unchanging) climate. Statistical methods thus may link extremes to an observed climatic trend, but this does not address the question of whether this trend is anthropogenic or caused by natural factors. Extreme-event statistics are challenging: extremes are by definition rare, so the tails of the probability density function are not well constrained and often cannot be assumed to be Gaussian. There are many types of conceivable extreme, such as for different regional entities or time periods as well as different weather parameters (some 27 indices for extremes have been proposed¹¹). To pick the type of extreme *post hoc* — for example, to study Pakistan rainfall extremes after a record-breaking event there — risks selection bias, that is, bias by selecting just the kind of time series that shows recent extremes. Proper statistical analysis of changes in the observed number of extremes thus requires: (1) a single, comparable type of extreme; (2) selection of time series by *a priori* objective criteria; and (3) sufficiently long-running high-quality data.

Table 1 | List of record-breaking meteorological events in the past decade and their impacts.

Year	Region	Meteorological record-breaking event	Impact, costs
2000	England and Wales	Wettest autumn on record ⁸³ since 1766.	£1.3 billion (ref. 27).
2002	Central Europe	Highest daily rainfall record in Germany ⁴² since at least 1901.	Flooding of Prague and Dresden, US\$15 billion (ref. 84).
2003	Europe	Hottest summer in at least 500 years ³⁰ .	Death toll exceeding 70,000 (ref. 31).
2004	South Atlantic	First hurricane in the South Atlantic ⁵¹ since 1970.	Three deaths, US\$425 million damage ⁸⁵ .
2005	North Atlantic	Record number of tropical storms, hurricanes and category 5 hurricanes ⁵² since 1970.	Costliest US natural disaster, 1,836 deaths (Hurricane Katrina).
2007	Arabian Sea England and Wales Southern Europe	Strongest tropical cyclone in the Arabian Sea ⁵³ since 1970. May–July wettest since records began in 1766 (ref. 43). Hottest summer on record in Greece ³³ since 1891.	Biggest natural disaster in the history of Oman ⁵³ . Major flooding causing ~£3 billion damage. Devastating wildfires.
2009	Victoria (Australia)	Heatwave breaking many station temperature records (32–154 years of data) ³⁴	Worst bushfires on record, 173 deaths, 3,500 houses destroyed ³⁴ .
2010	Western Russia	Hottest summer since 1500 (ref. 69).	500 wildfires around Moscow, grain-harvest losses of 30%.
	Pakistan	Rainfall records ⁴⁴ .	Worst flooding in Pakistan's history, nearly 3,000 deaths, affected 20 million people ⁶ .
	Eastern Australia	Highest December rainfall recorded since 1900 (ref. 45).	Brisbane flooding in January 2011, costing 23 lives and an estimated US\$2.55 billion ⁸⁶ .
2011	Southern United States Northeastern United States Texas, Oklahoma (United States)	Most active tornado month on record (April) ³ since 1950. January–October wettest on record ¹ since 1880. Most extreme July heat and drought since 1880 ² .	Tornado hit Joplin causing 116 deaths. Severe floods when Hurricane Irene hit. Wildfires burning 3 million acres (preliminary impact of US\$6–8 billion).
	Western Europe Western Europe	Hottest and driest spring on record in France ¹ since 1880. Wettest summer on record (The Netherlands, Norway) ¹ since 1901.	French grain harvest down by 12%. Not yet documented.
	Japan Republic of Korea	72-hour rainfall record (Nara Prefecture) ¹ . Wettest summer on record ¹ since 1908.	73 deaths, 20 missing, severe damage. Flooding of Seoul, 49 deaths, 77 missing, 125,000 affected.

The selection criterion for this (incomplete) list was that the event was documented to be record-breaking (that is, unprecedented) in a long measurement series.

In a stationary climate, the number of threshold-exceeding extremes should remain constant over time. Therefore, if a trend is detected in their number then this can be attributed to non-stationarity, that is, climatic change. The causes behind such non-stationarity can be a change in the mean, a change in the shape of the probability density function, or a combination of both. Some recent studies^{12–16} have focused on record-breaking extremes rather than on those exceeding a fixed threshold value. The advantage of studying record events is that knowledge of the probability density function is not required: the probability of a record in a stationary climate is simply $1/n$ in any year, where n is the number of years in the time series up to that year. This simple but fundamental property makes it easier to detect the amount by which the number of records exceeds that expected in a stationary climate, irrespective of whether this is owing to a change in mean⁹ or in variance¹².

Modelling and the attribution problem

Statistical analysis of climate data alone can not, in principle, reveal the physical cause of any changes. To link cause and effect requires a joint analysis of several time series: for example, the record-breaking 1998 high in global temperature can partly be linked to El Niño by correlation analysis^{17–19}. More commonly, to tackle this attribution problem, climate models are used to predict the response of the climate system to different driving forces^{20–22}. Such attribution studies take a particular event or class of events and try to quantify the contributions from individual forcings^{20,23}. To do so, many model simulations are carried out, each driven by different forcings, both natural (for example, solar variability and volcanism) and anthropogenic. To reduce model uncertainty, an ensemble of model runs is needed²⁰ and a sufficiently long time period should be

simulated to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. This requires ample computational power, and the number of such studies has thus been limited, but the approach has been applied both to extreme heat waves^{24,25} and rainfall events^{26,27}.

In general, such studies hinge on the climate model adequately representing extreme-event statistics: models need to get the unforced internal variability of extremes right as well as the spatiotemporal pattern of the forced response. This may well be true for large-scale, continent-wide heat extremes^{24,28}, but it is more questionable for storms or precipitation extremes, which tend to be underestimated by models^{26,29}. In the following, we will discuss specific types of extreme.

Heat extremes

Recent years have seen an exceptionally large number of record-breaking and destructive heatwaves in many parts of the world. Several recent studies indicate that many, possibly most, of these heatwaves would not have occurred without global warming.

In 2003, Europe suffered its hottest summer by far for at least 500 years³⁰, with temperatures in Switzerland topping the previous record by a full 2.4 °C, equivalent to 5.4 standard deviations^{31,32}. Greece experienced its hottest summer in 2007, with summer temperatures in Athens exceeding the 1961–1990 mean by 3.3 °C, corresponding to 3.7 standard deviations³³. Australia's worst bushfires on record, following an unprecedented heatwave, ravaged the country on the 'Black Saturday' of February 2009 (ref. 34). In 2010, central Russia suffered its worst heatwave since records began, with the July temperature in Moscow beating the previous record by 2.5 °C (ref. 5). Finally, in July 2011, the US Southern Plains were hit by a record-breaking heatwave².




Figure 2 | Century increase in the number of monthly heat records.

Ten-year running averages of the number of unprecedented records in monthly mean temperature in 204 time series are shown, namely 17 weather stations from around the world for each calendar month, given as the ratio of the observed number of extremes to that expected in a stationary climate. Based on the data analysis of Benestad¹³.

in recent years, hurricane intensity seems to be lagging behind the correlation found earlier. It is possible that the large increase observed from 1980 to 2005 is partly due to stratospheric cooling, which enhances the vertical temperature gradient, and not just surface warming⁵⁵. Globally, a significant increase in the intensity of tropical storms over the past three decades has been identified in the satellite record⁵⁶. Nevertheless, a recent review concluded that “it remains uncertain whether past changes in tropical cyclone activity have exceeded the variability expected from natural causes”⁵⁷.

Storm tracks associated with extratropical cyclones have moved polewards over the past 25 years⁵⁸, in conjunction with a poleward movement of the jet stream⁵⁹ and an expansion of the Hadley cells⁶⁰. At least for the tropical expansion, there is now robust evidence⁶⁰ based on several reanalysis data sets⁶¹ as well as *in situ* observations^{62–64}. In the Southern Hemisphere, the total number of storms has declined since the 1970s, but the number of deep cyclones (less than 980 hPa) has increased significantly⁶⁵. Some authors have found evidence for a similar development in the Northern Hemisphere, but the data are not conclusive^{66,67}.

Complex physics

Statistical detection and formal attribution studies thus at least qualitatively confirm what one would expect from the simple physical considerations mentioned at the outset: especially heat but also precipitation extremes increase strongly in a warming climate. However, climate change does not just consist of a simple background warming. Complex, possibly nonlinear interactions may either reduce or increase the incidence and magnitude of extremes.

Several recent unprecedented extremes were far outside the previous distribution. Why did temperatures in the 2003 European heatwave beat the previous record by 2.4 °C, if local climate warmed much less than that over the past 140 years? A simple shift of the previous, nearly Gaussian, probability distribution towards warmer values cannot explain this³². That such outliers are mere freak events, so called black swans, is a possibility⁶⁸. However, the recent clustering of outliers makes this seem highly unlikely. The exceptional heatwave of 2003 was surpassed again in 2010, if the larger Europe is considered (Fig. 4)⁶⁹. In fact, events of these sorts of magnitude are projected to occur only in the last part of the twenty-first century^{32,33,70,71}. A widening of the probability density function, in




Figure 3 | Power dissipation index for North Atlantic tropical storms linked to tropical sea surface temperature in the main development region for Atlantic hurricanes. Red line denotes North Atlantic tropical storms; blue line denotes tropical Atlantic sea surface temperature. For comparison, the evolution of Northern Hemisphere mean temperature from NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies is also shown (dotted line). All data are smoothed with a filter of half-width three years.

addition to a shift, is often invoked³², but this is merely descriptive and not a physical explanation.

These outliers indicate that nonlinear, possibly threshold processes are involved and several such mechanisms have been proposed. Schär *et al.*³² invoked a positive feedback with soil-moisture loss to explain the 2003 European heatwave, where the surface heat budget changes fundamentally once the soil has dried out and no more can be converted into latent heat by evaporation.

Anomalous atmospheric circulation patterns can greatly exacerbate the intensity and frequency of extreme events^{47,72}, and may also explain some observed outliers⁷³. During both of the extreme boreal summers of 2003 and 2010, the Northern Hemisphere jet stream was characterized by a strongly meandering pattern that remained locked in place for several weeks⁷⁴. These blocking situations brought persistent, and thus extreme, weather conditions to different regions in the Northern Hemisphere^{75,76}. Such patterns are more likely to form when the latitudinal temperature gradient is small, resulting in a weak circumpolar vortex, which occurred in 2003 as a result of an anomalously high near-Arctic sea surface temperatures⁷⁷. Although the probability that a new heat record would be set in Moscow was increased by a factor of five by the warming trend over the past decades in that area⁹, this does not explain the large amount by which the previous record was broken. Linking the 2010 Moscow heatwave to warming or to an exceptionally persistent blocking situation, that is, to atmospheric dynamical processes⁶⁸, thus provides complementary and not mutually exclusive explanations²⁵. Likewise, the 2010 Pakistan⁶ and 2011 Australia flooding events have been linked to a strong La Niña. Although this is probably an important factor, it does not explain the unprecedented nature of these events. Naturally occurring mechanisms such as El Niño/Southern Oscillation can cause extremes that, in combination with a changing background climate, turn into unprecedented events.

Conclusion

Many lines of evidence — statistical analysis of observed data, climate modelling and physical reasoning — strongly indicate that some types of extreme event, most notably heatwaves and precipitation extremes, will greatly increase in a warming climate and have already done so.

In 2007, the IPCC concluded that a future increase in the frequency of heatwaves and extreme precipitation events caused by




Figure 4 | European summer temperatures for 1500–2010. The upper panel shows the statistical frequency distribution of European (35° N, 70° N; 25° W, 40° E) summer land-temperature anomalies (relative to the 1970–1999 period) for the 1500–2010 period (vertical lines). The five warmest and coldest summers are highlighted. Grey bars represent the distribution for the 1500–2002 period with a Gaussian fit shown in black. The lower panel shows the running decadal frequency of extreme summers, defined as those with a temperature above the ninety-fifth percentile of the 1500–2002 distribution. A ten-year smoothing is applied. Reproduced with permission from ref. 69, © 2011 AAAS.

greenhouse warming in most continental areas is very likely (>90% probability) and an increase in intense tropical cyclone activity and drought-affected areas is likely (>66% probability)⁷. Some extreme events will decrease — extreme cold being the most obvious one. However, the overall number of extremes is expected to increase. Human society has adapted to the kind of extremes experienced in the past, so a lesser number of these will bring only modest benefits. But unprecedented new extremes can be devastating, as the Pakistan flooding of 2010 illustrates.

Future research should focus on a better understanding of the physical and dynamical processes behind some of the recently observed extreme events. Why did summer temperatures in Europe overshoot previous records by such a large margin both in 2003 and 2010? Fractional attribution of notable weather extremes over the past 50 years to specific forcings, as suggested by the International Group on Attribution of Climate-Related Events, is important⁷⁸, but can only be as good as the climate models used. Hence, a major effort to improve climate models with respect to their ability to capture extreme events is needed. Global climate models still have a well-known bias in daily precipitation amounts²⁹ and persistent blocking events are generally poorly represented^{79,80}. Therefore, such attribution studies will be truly effective only when the reasons behind such misfits are better understood and model bias can be overcome. Increasing the spatial resolution of models might be one way to do this, but an enhanced understanding of the nonlinear processes likely to be involved is just as important.

As well as improved modelling, there is still much to be learnt by statistical data analysis. To understand observed changes in the frequency of extremes, long time series are needed and further work should be directed at identifying and correcting for inhomogeneities

in data sets. For example, changes in observational practice have been shown to artificially enhance summer heat extremes in pre-1950s data from France⁸¹.

Many climate scientists (including ourselves) routinely answer media calls after extreme events with the phrase that a particular event cannot be directly attributed to global warming. This is often misunderstood by the public to mean that the event is not linked to global warming, even though that may be the case — we just can't be certain. If a loaded dice rolls a six, we cannot say that this particular outcome was due to the manipulation — the question is ill-posed. What we can say is that the number of sixes rolled is greater with the loaded dice (perhaps even much greater). Likewise, the odds for certain types of weather extremes increase in a warming climate (perhaps very much so). Attribution is not a 'yes or no' issue as the media might prefer, it is an issue of probability. It is very likely that several of the unprecedented extremes of the past decade would not have occurred without anthropogenic global warming. Detailed analysis can provide specific numbers for certain types of extreme, as in the examples discussed above.

In 1988, Jim Hansen famously stated in a congressional hearing that "it is time to stop waffling so much and say that the evidence is pretty strong that the greenhouse effect is here"⁸². We conclude that now, more than 20 years later, the evidence is strong that anthropogenic, unprecedented heat and rainfall extremes are here — and are causing intense human suffering.

References

1. World Meteorological Organization *Provisional Statement on the Status of the Global Climate* (WMO, 2011); available at http://www.wmo.int/pages/mediacentre/press_releases/gcs_2011_en.html.
2. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration *July 2011 - Oppressive Heat Locally and Across the Nation* (NOAA, 2011); available at http://www.erh.noaa.gov/iln/climo/summaries/julyheat_summary.php.
3. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration *Preliminary Tornado Statistics Including Records Set in 2011* (NOAA, 2011); available at http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/2011_tornado_information.html.
4. World Meteorological Organization *Weather Extremes in a Changing Climate: Hindsight on Foresight* (WMO, 2011).
5. World Meteorological Organization *Current Extreme Weather Events* (WMO, 2010); available at www.wmo.int/pages/mediacentre/news/extremeweathersequence_en.html.
6. Hong, C. *et al.* Roles of European blocking and tropical-extratropical interaction in the 2010 Pakistan flooding. *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **38**, L13806 (2011).
7. IPCC *Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis* (eds Solomon, S. *et al.*) (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007).
8. IPCC *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation* (eds Field, C. B. *et al.*) 1–19 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012).
9. Rahmstorf, S. & Coumou, D. Increase of extreme events in a warming world. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **108**, 17905–17909 (2011).
10. Trenberth, K. E. Changes in precipitation with climate change. *Clim. Res.* **47**, 123–138 (2010).
11. Alexander, L. V. *et al.* Global observed changes in daily climate extremes of temperature and precipitation. *J. Geophys. Res.* **111**, D05109 (2006).
12. Anderson, A. & Kostinski, A. Reversible record breaking and variability: Temperature distributions across the globe. *J. Appl. Meteorol. Climatol.* **49**, 1681–1691 (2010).
13. Benestad, R. E. Record-values, nonstationarity tests and extreme value distributions. *Glob. Planet. Change* **44**, 11–26 (2004).
14. Franke, J., Wergen, G. & Krug, J. Records and sequences of records from random variables with a linear trend. *J. Stat. Mech.* **10**, P100013 (2010).
15. Krug, J. Records in a changing world. *J. Stat. Mech.* **7**, P07001 (2007).
16. Meehl, G. A. *et al.* Relative increase of record high maximum temperatures compared to record low minimum temperatures in the US. *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **36**, L23701 (2009).
17. Lean, J. L. & Rind, D. H. How natural and anthropogenic influences alter global and regional surface temperatures: 1889 to 2006. *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **35**, 1–6 (2008).
18. Schönwiese, C. D., Walter, A. & Brinckmann, S. Statistical assessments of anthropogenic and natural global climate forcing. An update. *Meteorol. Z.* **19**, 3–10 (2010).
19. Foster, G. & Rahmstorf, S. Global temperature evolution 1979–2010. *Environ. Res. Lett.* **6**, 044022 (2011).

20. Allen, M. R. & Stott, P. A. Estimating signal amplitudes in optimal fingerprinting, part I: Theory. *Clim. Dynam.* **21**, 477–491 (2003).
21. Hegerl, G. C. *et al.* Climate change detection and attribution: Beyond mean temperature signals. *J. Clim.* **19**, 5058–5077 (2006).
22. Stott, D. A. & Allen, M. R. The end-to-end attribution problem: From emissions to impacts. *Climatic Change* **71**, 303–318 (2005).
23. Stott, P. A. *et al.* Detection and attribution of climate change: A regional perspective. *WIREs Clim. Change* **1**, 192–211 (2010).
24. Stott, P. A., Stone, D. A. & Allen, M. R. Human contribution to the European heatwave of 2003. *Nature* **432**, 610–614 (2004).
25. Otto, F. E. L. *et al.* Reconciling two approaches to attribution of the 2010 Russian heat wave. *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **39**, L04702 (2012).
26. Min, S. K. *et al.* Human contribution to more-intense precipitation extremes. *Nature* **470**, 378–381 (2011).
27. Pall, P. *et al.* Anthropogenic greenhouse gas contribution to flood risk in England and Wales in autumn 2000. *Nature* **470**, 382–386 (2011).
28. Karoly, D. J. *et al.* Detection of a human influence on North American climate. *Science* **302**, 1200–1203 (2003).
29. Kharin, V. V., Zwiers, F. W. & Zhang, X. Intercomparison of near-surface temperature and precipitation extremes in AMIP-2 simulations, reanalyses, and observations. *J. Clim.* **18**, 5201–5223 (2005).
30. Luterbacher, J. *et al.* European seasonal and annual temperature variability, trends and extremes since 1500. *Science* **303**, 1499–1503 (2004).
31. Robine, J. M. *et al.* Death toll exceeded 70,000 in Europe during the summer of 2003. *C. R. Biol.* **331**, 171–178 (2008).
32. Schär, C. *et al.* The role of increasing temperature variability in European summer heat waves. *Nature* **427**, 332–336 (2004).
33. Founda, D. & Giannakopoulos, C. The exceptionally hot summer of 2007 in Athens, Greece — A typical summer in the future climate? *Glob. Planet. Change* **67**, 227–236 (2009).
34. Karoly, D. The recent bushfires and extreme heat wave in southeast Australia. *Bull. Aust. Meteorol. Oceanogr. Soc.* **22**, 10–13 (2009).
35. Trewin, B. & Vermont, H. Changes in the frequency of record temperatures in Australia, 1957–2009. *Aust. Meteorol. Oceanogr. J.* **60**, 113–119 (2010).
36. Wergen, G. & Krug, J. Record-breaking temperatures reveal a warming climate. *EPL* **92**, 30008 (2010).
37. Della-Marta, P. M. *et al.* Doubled length of western European summer heat waves since 1880. *J. Geophys. Res.* **112**, D15103 (2007).
38. Kuglitsch, F. G. *et al.* Heat wave changes in the eastern Mediterranean since 1960. *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **37**, L04802 (2010).
39. Kalkstein, L. S. & Smoyer, K. E. The impact of climate change on human health: Some international implications. *Experientia* **49**, 969–979 (1993).
40. Smoyer, K. E. A comparative analysis of heat waves and associated mortality in St. Louis, Missouri — 1980 and 1995. *Int. J. Biometeorol.* **42**, 44–50 (1998).
41. Tan, J. *et al.* Heat wave impacts on mortality in Shanghai, 1998 and 2003. *Int. J. Biometeorol.* **51**, 193–200 (2006).
42. Becker, A. & Grünwald, U. Flood risk in central Europe. *Science* **300**, 1099 (2003).
43. World Meteorological Organization *State of the Climate in 2007* (WMO, 2009).
44. Webster, P. J., Toma, V. E. & Kim, H. M. Were the 2010 Pakistan floods predictable? *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **38**, L04806 (2011).
45. Australian Bureau of Meteorology *Australian Climate Variability and Change — Time Series Graphs* (2011); available at <http://www.bom.gov.au/cgi-bin/climate/change/timeseries.cgi>.
46. Groisman, P. Y. A. *et al.* Trends in intense precipitation in the climate record. *J. Clim.* **18**, 1326–1350 (2005).
47. Jacobeit, J. *et al.* Central European precipitation and temperature extremes in relation to large-scale atmospheric circulation types. *Meteorol. Z.* **18**, 397–410 (2009).
48. Lenderink, G. & van Meijgaard, E. Increase in hourly precipitation extremes beyond expectations from temperature changes. *Nature Geosci.* **1**, 511–515 (2008).
49. Lenderink, G. *et al.* Scaling and trends of hourly precipitation extremes in two different climate zones — Hong Kong and the Netherlands. *Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci.* **15**, 3033–3041 (2011).
50. Haerter, J. O. & Berg, P. Unexpected rise in extreme precipitation caused by a shift in rain type? *Nature Geosci.* **2**, 372–373 (2009).
51. Pezza, A. B. & Simmonds, I. The first South Atlantic hurricane: Unprecedented blocking, low shear and climate change. *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **32**, 1–5 (2005).
52. Trenberth, K. E. & Shea, D. J. Atlantic hurricanes and natural variability in 2005. *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **33**, 1–4 (2006).
53. Fritz, H. M. *et al.* Cyclone Gonu storm surge in Oman. *Estuar. Coast. Shelf Sci.* **86**, 102–106 (2010).
54. Emanuel, K. Increasing destructiveness of tropical cyclones over the past 30 years. *Nature* **436**, 686–688 (2005).
55. Emanuel, K. Tropical cyclone activity downscaled from NOAA-CIRES reanalysis, 1908–1958. *J. Adv. Model. Earth Syst.* **2**, 1–12 (2010).
56. Elsner, J. B., Kossin, J. P. & Jagger, T. H. The increasing intensity of the strongest tropical cyclones. *Nature* **455**, 92–95 (2008).
57. Knutson, T. R. *et al.* Tropical cyclones and climate change. *Nature Geosci.* **3**, 157–163 (2010).
58. Bender, F. A.-M., Ramanathan, V. & Tselioudis, G. Changes in extratropical storm track cloudiness 1983–2008: Observational support for a poleward shift. *Clim. Dynam.* <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00382-011-1065-6> (2011).
59. Archer, C. L. & Caldeira, K. Historical trends in the jet streams. *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **35**, L08803 (2008).
60. Seidel, D. J. *et al.* Widening of the tropical belt in a changing climate. *Nature Geosci.* **1**, 21–24 (2008).
61. Wang, X. L., Swail, V. R. & Zwiers, F. W. *Climateology and changes of extratropical cyclone activity: Comparison of ERA-40 with NCEP–NCAR reanalysis for 1958–2001*. *J. Clim.* **19**, 3145–3166 (2006).
62. Chang, E. K. M. & Guo, Y. Is the number of North Atlantic tropical cyclones significantly underestimated prior to the availability of satellite observations? *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **34**, L14801 (2007).
63. Ulbrich, U., Leckebusch, G. C. & Pinto, J. G. Extra-tropical cyclones in the present and future climate: A review. *Theor. Appl. Climatol.* **96**, 117–131 (2009).
64. Vilbich, I. & Sepic, J. Long-term variability and trends of sea level storminess and extremes in European seas. *Glob. Planet. Change* **71**, 1–12 (2010).
65. Pezza, A. B. & Ambrizzi, T. Variability of Southern Hemisphere cyclone and anticyclone behavior: Further analysis. *J. Clim.* **16**, 1075–1083 (2003).
66. Graham, N. E. & Diaz, H. F. Evidence for intensification of North Pacific winter cyclones since 1948. *Bull. Am. Meteorol. Soc.* **82**, 1869–1893 (2001).
67. Gulev, S. K., Zolina, O. & Grigoriev, S. Extra-tropical cyclone variability in the Northern Hemisphere winter from NCEP/NCAR reanalysis data. *Clim. Dynam.* **17**, 795–809 (2001).
68. Dole, R. *et al.* Was there a basis for anticipating the 2010 Russian heat wave? *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **38**, L06702 (2011).
69. Barriopedro, D. *et al.* The hot summer of 2010: Redrawing the temperature record map of Europe. *Science* **332**, 220–224 (2011).
70. Beniston, M. The 2003 heat wave in Europe: A shape of things to come? An analysis based on Swiss climatological data and model simulations. *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **31**, L02202 (2004).
71. Kysely, J. Recent severe heat waves in central Europe: How to view them in a long-term prospect? *Int. J. Climatol.* **30**, 89–109 (2010).
72. Knox, J. C. Significance of modern and Holocene floods to climate change. *Quat. Sci. Rev.* **19**, 439–457 (2000).
73. Cassou, C., Terray, L. & Phillips, A. S. Tropical Atlantic influence on European heat waves. *J. Clim.* **18**, 2805–2811 (2005).
74. Schubert, S., Wang, H. & Suarez, M. Warm season subseasonal variability and climate extremes in the Northern Hemisphere: The role of stationary Rossby waves. *J. Clim.* **24**, 4773–4792 (2011).
75. Ogi, M., Yamazaki, K. & Tachibana, Y. The summer northern annular mode and abnormal summer weather in 2003. *Geophys. Res. Lett.* **32**, L04706 (2005).
76. Tachibana, Y. *et al.* Abrupt evolution of the summer Northern Hemisphere annular mode and its association with blocking. *J. Geophys. Res.* **115**, D12125 (2010).
77. Feudale, L. & Shukla, J. Influence of sea surface temperature on the European heat wave of 2003 summer. Part I: An observational study. *Clim. Dynam.* **36**, 1691–1703 (2011).
78. Schiermeier, Q. Extreme measures. *Nature* **477**, 148–149 (2011).
79. D'Andrea, F. *et al.* Northern Hemisphere atmospheric blocking as simulated by 15 atmospheric general circulation models in the period 1979–1988. *Clim. Dynam.* **4**, 385–407 (1998).
80. Vial, J. & Osborn, T. J. Assessment of atmosphere–ocean general circulation model simulations of winter Northern Hemisphere atmospheric blocking. *Clim. Dynam.* <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00382-011-1177-z> (2011).
81. Etien, N. *et al.* Summer maximum temperature in northern France over the past century: Instrumental data versus multiple proxies (tree-ring isotopes, grape harvest dates and forest fires). *Climatic Change* **94**, 429–456 (2008).
82. Shabecoff, P. Global warming has begun, expert tells senate. *New York Times* (24 June 1988); available via <http://go.nature.com/EJMcBa>.
83. Alexander, L. V. & Jones, P. D. Updated precipitation series for the UK and discussion of recent extremes. *Atmos. Sci. Lett.* **1**, 1–9 (2001).
84. Mueller, M. Damages of the Elbe flood 2002 in Germany: A review. *Geophys. Res. Abstr.* **5**, 992 (2003).
85. McTaggart-Cowan, R. *et al.* Analysis of Hurricane Catarina (2004). *Mon. Weather Rev.* **134**, 3029–3053 (2006).
86. Ven den Honert, R. C. & McAneney, J. The 2011 Brisbane floods: Causes, impacts and implications. *Water* **3**, 1149–1173 (2011).

Acknowledgements

We thank R. Benestad for providing original data from ref. 13 and K. Emanuel for providing updated data for Fig. 2.

Additional information

The authors declare no competing financial interests. Reprints and permissions information is available online at <http://www.nature.com/reprints>.